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Following deregulation, a foreign airline group (Ansett) began jet service in 1987 - thereby challenging 
the sole incumbent jet operator (Air New Zealand). This study describes and analyses that entry and the 
subsequent and continuing rivalry between the two companies. The major findings are: in order to compete, the 
entrant judged it was necessary to match or to come close to matching the incumbent in flight frequency; the 
entrant intended quality competition only, and the incumbent responded with fare cuts as well; although travel 
increased, load factors declined markedly; and both airlines have suffered financially; the entrant has so far 
survived its sizeable losses, thanks to continuing support from its Australian owners. 
INTRODUCTION 
Following many years of regulation1, the New Zealand government legislated2 to deregulate domestic 
airline markets from 1 April 1984. At first, changes were confined to third level services. It was only in 1986 that 
the Australian airline Ansett decided to form a New Zealand company, to offer jet service. The incumbent, Air 
New Zealand (then government-owned) was quick to respond. This paper studies the strategies of the rivals from 
the time of Ansett's entry (July 1987) up to December 1990 (with the addition of some data for 1991). 
It may be marvelled that there was entry by a second jet carrier into such a small market. About half of 
the New Zealand population' of3.3 million is concentrated in three urban areas, Auckland (population 850,000), 
Wellington (325,000) and Christchurch (300,000); none of the other cities has a population in excess of about 
100,000. Furthermore, most of the inter-city distances are small (300 to 500 km), with the notable exception of 
Auckland-Christchurch (747 km). However surface travel between the two islands depends on the Cook Strait 
ferries, and this gives airlines an important advantage, especially in connecting Christchurch in the south with the 
north-island cities of Wellington and Auckland. 
THE ENTRY OF ANSETT NZ, AND THE AIR NEW ZEALAND RESPONSE 
Upon entry, Ansett immediately started jet service between Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, 
thereby engaging in direct competition with Air New Zealand on the core of the latter's jet network (Table 1). 
The quality of the Air New Zealand service had long been the subject of some adverse comment, 
especially from business travellers. Apart from minor use of new B767 aircraft (purchased principally for 
international service), the airline operated B737 aircraft in a single-class layout with seating of relatively high 
density, and offered limited cabin service. Air NZ did not board passengers through airbridges, even though 
Wellington (in particular) often has wet and windy conditions. 
Although using the B737 (and starting with three old, model 100 aircraft, to reduce the initial cost), Ansett 
introduced first class as well as standard-class service, and made a feature of in-flight catering (including hot dishes 
on meal-time flights); at its new passenger terminals, it did provide airbridges. In the cabins of the B737-100 
aircraft, first class passengers were seated in rows of 2 + 2, with a 36-inch pitch. In regard to fares, the Ansett 
strategy was to sell standard seats at the same fares as Air New Zealand charged for its economy class, and to offer 
the first class service at a 50o/o surcharge. 
Because of Air New Zealand's previous record, it is possible that Ansett expected only a limited response. 
In the event, however, the reaction was very vigorous. As the incumbent, Air New Zealand had the advantage 
of observing the necessarily lengthy preparations of the entrant. By the time that Ansett NZ finally started, Air 
New Zealand had introduced many innovations. Several aircraft cabins were re-configured to offer Pacific Class 
(the business class already offered on Air New Zealand's international services) in seven rows of2 + 2 seats; and 
cabin service was upgraded in economy class. It also introduced some discounted fares with restrictive conditions. 
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The airline continued to operate other B737 aircraft with the previous all-economy layout and limited cabin 
service, but now at reduced fares .. 
AIRCRAFT AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENTS: THE MAIN TRUNK ROUTES 
Ansett built up its fleet by the addition of a fourth B737-100 and two B737-200 aircraft. At the end ofl 988, 
it started jet service between Christchurch and Dunedin. Although it announced plans to acquire new B737 
aircraft, this plan was abandoned in favourof a new BAe 146 fleet, to replace all the B737 aircraft. Introduction 
of the new type began in 1989, with eight aircraft in service by January 1990. 
The introduction of the BAe 146 brought several advantages. The aircraft's quiet engines boosted the 
airline's image especially in Wellington where the airport's location gives a significant noise problem. The lower 
weight of the aircraft reduced the per-flight payment of landing charges, and this was of special importance at a 
time when such charges were being sharply increased. The aircraft's smaller capacity (on average, about 25o/o less 
than that of the B737 models used in New Zealand) allowed Ansett to increase its load factors, and to come closer 
to matching Air New Zealand's frequencies, without having to match its available seat-km. 
As seen in Table 1, Ansett put particular emphasis on the most dense route of all, Auckland-Wellington, 
and by November 1990 did there fully match the Air New Zealand frequency. Forits part, Air New Zealand, up 
to May 1990, chose to increase its frequencies on all trunk routes except that one, presumably in the hope that 
ii would therby reduce Ansett's gains in market share. For the seven trunk routes, the details are shown in Table 
1 (for frequency) and Table 2 (for seat-km). 
By mid-1990, however, Air New Zealand had reached a turning point in its affairs. There had long been 
concern within the company about the financial position of its domestic service, and especially the informal 
obligation on the national carrier to offer services to the smaller communities. (These services used F27 turbo-
props, each with 40 or 48 seats; the aircraft were large relative to the low density of these secondary routes.) After 
privatisation in 1989, the company seems to have become even more concerned about loss-making activities 
within its total activity. This no doubt helps to explain several major decisions taken in 1990. Among these are 
the sizeable frequency reductions made in November 1990, on most of the main trunk routes (Table 1 ), intended 
no doubt to secure higher load factors for the reduced capacity (Table 2). This issue is examined later. 
The consequences of Ansett's expansion and Air New Zealand's recent contraction on the main trunk 
routes are summarised in the market share analysis for these routes in Table 3. Also to be noted there is the Ansett 
share in all jet capacity, which has gradually moved up to 32%. 
DEVELOPMENTS ON OTHER ROUTES 
The financial concerns of the privatised Air New Zealand became even more apparent in mid-1990 when 
the company announced plans to withdraw its entire fleet of fifteen F27 aircraft; by December 1990 this process 
was complete, resulting in hundreds of employees losing their jobs. 
Of course, the airline did not simply abandon these routes. The November 1990 timetable saw the 
switching of some B737 capacity to the more dense of these routes. At the same time, jet service to these ports 
is still supplemented by turbo-prop operations. But here too the arrangements are new. In mid-1988, Air New 
Zealand purchased 50% share-holdings in Eagle Air (based in Hamilton) and in Air Nelson (based in the South 
Island city of Nelson). The withdrawal of the F27 fleet has allowed expansion of these companies, especially Air 
Nelson which has acquired and is now using Saab 340 aircraft (33 seats) on many of the more important routes, 
and is the major success story in the reorganisation. 
The remaining part of the Air New Zealand group is Mount Cook Airlines, which became a wholly-
owned subsidiary when Air New Zealand bought the remaining20% of the shares in December 1990. Here there 
has been little change. Mount Cook still emphasies tourist routes, mainly using HS748 turbo-props (which are now 
very old). Air New Zealand has major problems here, especially because Ansell NZ has entered the major tourist 
routes in a vigorous manner. The quiet engines of the BAe 146, and its ability to operate from a short runaway, 
have allowed Ansett to introduce the first-ever jet service to the important tourist pcirt of Queenstown. Ansett 
NZ also operates jets into the other major tourist centre of Rotorua. Besides still operating its own Dash-8 turbo-
props on some of the lesser routes, it has entered into commercial arrangements with some small third-level 
companies; but unlike Air New Zealand it has not taken any share-holdings. 
FARES 
Air New Zealand had some discount fares in place before Ansett's entry. From February 1986, there was 
a Thrifty fare (43% discount on the standard economy fare). In August 1986, it introduced a Super Thrifty fare 
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(55o/o discount, with, of course, conditions that were more restrictive than those for the Thrifty). The August 
move, at least, seems to have been a part of the company's strategy for dealing with the anticipated entry. At the 
time of entry, Air New Zealand's quality upgrading led to more cabin space per passenger being offered for the 
same economy fare. On those aircraft that continued in high-density cabin configuration, the company reduced 
the standard fares - by 25% in peak periods, and by 35% off-peak. 
The Ansett camp seems to have intended to engage only in quality competition, and to have viewed Air 
New Zealand's discounted and reduced fares with disapproval, perhaps even disgust. Nevertheless the market 
imperative drove Ansett to price-competition too. 
Ansett launched its first-class service at a 50% surcharge (which accurately reflected the cabin floor-
space relativity). When this did not succeed (in a market where the short distances make it easy for passengers 
to adhere to traditional views about inessentials) Ansett substituted a business class and followed Air New 
Zealand's surcharge of a fixed NZ$22 (irrespective of journey length). In economy class, Ansett introduced 
matching discounts of 43o/o and 55%. While its circumstances did not make it sensible to offer a high-density 
layout and fare, it did introduce a readily-available off-peak fare at a 30% reduction. 
In late 1988, Air New Zealand converted the remaining high-density aircraft to the new layout, and 
adopted the 30% off-peak reduction. In late 1989, both companies trimmed the discounts slightly, from 43% to 
40%, and from 55% to 50%. More importantly, by November 1990 both companies had withdrawn the 50% 
discount on most major trunk routes. As one airline spokesperson put it, travellers- even some of those travelling 
on business - had become adept at shopping around, and the airline wished to discourage the notion that a'50o/o 
off-peak discqunt was normal. 
Afterthe initial plateau, the business-class surcharge was increased markedly- to $33in May 1989, to $45 
in October 1990 (the two airlines moving in step). These increases run well ahead of inflation (cf. Table 4). On 
peak flights when capacity is fully used, the opportunity costs of business and economy class passengers are in 
proportion to the respective floor-space allocations. On that measure, the initial $22 surcharge (typically only 
about 10% to 15% of the then economy fares) was much too low. On off-peak flights, when there are empty seats, 
then of course any surcharge adds to net revenue. Nevertheless the chosen surcharge was low by the conventions 
adopted elsewhere ( eg. in Australia); perhaps Air New Zealand deliberately set a low figure to impose maximum 
damage to the prospects for Ansett's first class. 
Until the end of 1990, the full economy fares for the various journeys on jet aircraft have been determined 
(to a close approximation) by a linear formula, with a uniform percentage increase applied to the previous fare 
level. For the November 1990fares, a line fitted by eye gives a flagfall of NZ $100 and a distance charge of27 cents 
per km. Because all the discounts are in percentage form, those fares too are linearly related to distance. It is 
interesting to note that competition had not disturbed the relativities, which have their origins in the quasi-
administrative pricing of Air New Zealand before entry; but see also note 5 to Table 4. 
Since entry, these core fares have been increased by about 11 % in September 1988, about 7.5% in July/ 
August 1989, about 8% in May 1990 and about 10% in November 1990 (each percentage rise being calculated on 
the immediately preceding fare level). The second of these increases included an increase from 10% to 12.5o/o in 
GST (the Goods and Services Tax which is the value-added tax levied on almost everything). The fourth increase 
arose in part from sharply-increased fuel costs. 
The consequences for indexes of nominal and real fares are summarised in the quarterly data in Table 
4. The last column there reports an index number calculated by the Department of Statistics New Zealand, which 
takes a conventional approach using a weighted basket of a sample of discounted and undiscounted fares on all 
routes Get and other services) of all operators. That index number series shows that entry resulted in a significant 
decrease in average real fares (thanks to the introduction of discounted fares). Subsequently, real fares declined 
further - because of the delay in raising nominal fares - and then rose sharply in 1990. The index of real fares has 
fluctuated in 1991. Though significantly up from the low of September 1989, it is still somewhat below the level 
prevailing just after entry, and well below the level obtaining two years before entry. Within that average, note 
that (real) core fares have risen by nearly 20°/o since entry; the divergence of core fares from average fares mirrors 
experience of deregualtion elsewhere, notably in the U.S. 
Besides fares, the consumer is interested in service quality. This has improved, not merely in respect of 
cabin service and airbridges, but also because the reduced load-factors increas the chance of getting a seat at busy 
times. Of course, the financial losses of the airlines (discussed in the next section) remind us that a market 
equilibrium has yet to be reached. 
OUTPUT, LOAD FACTORS, REVENUES AND LOSSES 
Following entry, passenger numbers and passenger km travelled rose significantly. From 1985 to 1990, 
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despite the downturn in the New Zealand economy, passenger km rose by about 35% (Table 5), thanks no doubt 
to a reduction of about 25o/o in average (real) airfares. as well as the improvements in quality. 
But the increase in capacity, due mainly to the addition of the Ansett fleet, was so great that load factors 
declined. On its domestic services taken as a whole (i.e. including the problem-ridden F27 services as well as the 
major jet routes), Air New Zealand had enjoyed load factors of around 70% in the years immediately before the 
Ansell entry. As seen in Table 5, these declined appreciably after entry. By 1990 the industry-wide load factor 
was down to 58%. Ansell's load factor was probably in the low fifties in its first two years. but had probably 
increased significantly by the end of 1990. On the three main routes (between Auckland, Christchurch and 
Wellington), the industry load factors ranged between 72% and 76% in 1986, but were only between 53% and 
64% in 1990 (data from the Ministry of Transport). 
Given the lower load factors and the reductions in fares, it is not surprising that both companies have been 
incurring losses on these services. In the case of Air New Zealand, it is difficult to give firm figures, because the 
published accounts aggregate domestic with international services. For the year to March 1990, the airline as a 
whole enjoyed an operating profit of NZ$ 62 million. In the next financial period (15 months to June 1991), the 
international services too were in financial trouble, thanks to the world-wide downtown in international travel; 
the airline's operating result is reported as a loss of NZ$14 million, before taking account of several negative and 
positive abnormals (Australian Aviation, November 1991, p. 69). 
Although fully owned by Ansell Transport Industries (in Australia) the Ansell NZ operation is 
registered as a New Zealand company. So far, the financial picture for that company has been gloomy, as seen 
in Table 6. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that airline gross revenue is still growing in real terms, and that the 
before-tax annual operating losses are diminishing. 
In starting a new airline, a company has significant establishment costs, and may expect to need time to 
build market share. Nevertheless, deficits have been larger than expected. As the directors put it in their 1990 
report, "the group did not achieve satisfactory results, with losses in excess of budget. These accounts have been 
prepared on a going concern basis and in anticipation of continuing support from the ultimate holding company, 
Ansett Transport Industries Limited." 
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
Before entering the market, Ansett had to face a number of difficulties. In particular, preparations for 
entry took more than 12 months, and required establishment of a management structure, and recruitement and 
training of staff. Further, with Air New Zealand finding that it needed all (or almost all) the space in the existing 
passenger terminals, Ansett had to design and build its own terminals at Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. 
While the Chicago school is grudging in its recognition of barriers to entry, considerable investment expenditure 
was required ($28 million in the case of the terminals), and much of this expenditure would not be recovered in 
the event of withdrawas from the market. (For an interesting account of commitment in the context of airline 
entry, see Beeslet. 
In the remainder of the contestability debate, a key question is whether the entrant can make profits in 
the period before the incumbent can adjust prices. Of course, competition can also involve quality adjustment, 
and it is observed that such changes may take more time (Tirole', pp. 310-311). As already seen, Ansett initially 
offered quality competition only (unlike entry in the US industry which depended mainly on price competition). 
Furthermore, by immediately entering all three sectors of the core-triangle of the Air New Zealand network, 
Ansell could match a good part of the networking economies enjoyed by the incumbent. It is true that Air New 
Zealand benefited from greater access to on-carriage business from minor routes; nevertheless this advantage was 
small because of the dominance of the triangle. 
Much of the Air New Zealand response comprised price competition. As already noted, some of the fares 
moves were made before the Ansett entry. (This supportfthe view formed in the light of other experience of 
airline deregulation, that in regard to the possibility of hit-and-run profits, airline markets are not significantly 
contestable.) Air New Zealand also moved up-market, with its introduction of business class, and a more spacious 
layout in the economy class cabin. (Much of this was done at the time of entry,supporting the view (Forsyth', pp. 
11-12) that, save for network changes, airlines can adjust quality characteristics relatively quickly.) However the 
conversion of an aircraft to a mixed business class/economy class layout reduced capacity by up to 15 seats. As 
a result, on some peak-time flights, Air New Zealand lost passengers to the entrant. This helped Ansell NZ to 
gain initial market share. (As already noted, Air New Zealand later added more aircraft.) 
In the face of this aggressive response, Ansett has had a difficult time. While the revenue passenger 
kilometres may have been up to the planned level, the fare-discounting seems not to have been fully anticipated. 
Further, Ansett's own decisions had their shortcomings. In addition to the mistaken introduction of first-class 
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service, it seems that Ansett's use of very old aircraft elsewhere in the world. Certainly the introduction of the new 
BAe 146 aircraft (with quiet engines and considerable passenger appeal) is believed to have enhanced Ansell's 
market share. Indeed the introduction of the new aircraft amounts to a re-launching of the airline, both because 
of the quality enhancement and because of the cost involved (comprising the costs of making the change, as well 
as the higher depreciation costs. that are reflected in the lease commitments). 
In 1990, the success of the new aircraft together with the increasing financial pressure on Air New 
Zealand may have been the factors that persuaded the latter company to reduce its capacity on most of the main 
trunk routes. (Might it be that Air New Zealand now accepts that Ansell is there to stay?) The Air New Zealand 
jet capacity thereby released has been redeployed on routes to Napier/Hastings, Hamilton and Palmerston. While 
this has been done to replace some of the F27 capacity, and to help obtain higher load factors on the main trunk 
routes, it may be that the company is also trying to make it more expensive for Ansett to enter those secondary 
markets. 
As to fares, it is significant that in 1990 the deeper discounts were trimmed and the core fares were 
increased markedly. As a referee of this paper points out, however, this does not necessarily imply that the 
intensity of competition has abated. Rather it may simply reflect a move to reduce losses after excessive price-
cutting. 
CIRCUMSTANCES FAVOURING ENTRY 
Given the difficult times experienced by entrant airlines in the US, and given the limited extent ofentry 
in some other countries, it remains to be explained why entry occurred in such a small market as that of New 
Zealand. There seem to be a number of circumstances that encouraged entry by Ansett. 
The Ansett interests already had considerable airline experience, especially in Australia which is 
somewhat similar to New Zealand in socio-economic characteristics. Thsu many of the techniques developed by 
Ansell in Australia could be (and were) transferred to the new company in New Zealand. Also, although the 
Ansett organisation is not large by world airline standards, it is large relative to the scale of entry needed in the 
New Zealand market; furthermore, Ansell's owners (TNT and News Limited) control very large businesses in 
other industries. A related point is that it was easy for Ansett to enter immediately a major part of the incumbent's 
jet network. This protected Ansett from a tactic sometimes used by an incumbent, namely cutting fares only on 
the routes entered, and cross-subsidising from the other routes where the incumbent does not face competition. 
(In the outcome, this tactic has not been used in New Zealand, unlike the situation in Australia, where (even under 
regulation!) the two major airlines made selective fare cuts on routes served by small rivals - see Independent 
Review', pp. 330-333 and 369-371.) 
On the demand side, the success of Ansett in Australia meant that New Zealanders already knew the 
brand-name; indeed many business (and other) travellers in New Zealand had already travelled on Ansell in 
Australia, knew of the high quality of its services, and compared these favourably with the pre-entry style of the 
domestic services of Air New Zealand. 
The international interests of the Ansett group include an aircraft leasing company, and this connection 
too may have been of assistance. That company placed a very large orderforBAe 146 aircraft, some of which have 
been introduced into a number of Ansett group operations. Also, when Ansett NZ decided not to introduce the 
B737-500 aircraft, it seems the order was not cancelled but rather was transferred to the leasing company. 
Among other factors relating to supply interdependence between aviation markets, the establishment of 
a New Zealand company might be expected to further the long-stated ambition of Ansell to become an 
international airline. Furthermore, a New Zealand domestic airline is materially helped if it can get on-carriage 
business from international carriers. Ansett NZ made a mutual arrangement with Quantas: each steers on-
carriage business towards the other. This arrangement may not last much longer, now that Qantas owns some of 
the Air New Zealand shares, and the two companies are integrating their trans-Tasman services (i.e. between 
Australian and New Zealand). It now seems that the two governments may soon grant trans-Tasman rights to the 
Ansett group (should the company want them). 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the early days of the contestability thesis, there were both economists and policy advisers who were 
very willing to argue that airline markets are contestable; in doing so, they relied on observations that there were 
only very limited economies of scale in aircraft operation and maintenance. Since that time there has been 
increased emphasis on network economies and on various non-price factors relating to marketing strategies (e.g. 
computer reservation systems, incentives to travel agents, information reaching potential customers, service 
frequency) - see Levine\ Morrison and Winston''. In consequence, airline markets in general are no longer 
regarded as bheing readily contestable, although entry seems to be easier in some circumstances than in others 
(Hurdle'", and Abbott and Thompson"). 
The New Zealand case illustrates some aspects of this, especially the significance of flight frequency. 
There have been U.S. carriers who have attempted to play a 'niche' role, supplying infrequent services on a route 
where one or more large airlines offer frequent service; even thought he niche company may offer lower fares, 
the strategy has been generally unsuccessful. Under bilateral liberalization of a few European airline markets, 
there ahs been some entry by small companies, sometimes offering only a very small fraction of total capacity. To 
the extent that such entrants appear durable, these cases may appear to suggest that it is not necessary to offer 
frequent service. However, on both of the routes that have seen significant entry (London-Amsterdam, and 
London-Dublin), the small companies initiated service at separate.minor ports (Stansted and Luton rather than 
London Heathrow- see Abbott and Thompson'', pp.134-136). Thus it may be argued that entry was to a separate, 
small market, in which the entrant had a very large share. 
Such separation is not available in the New Zealand case. Ansett decided (probably correctly) that it 
would not be able to thrive without offering frequent flights. The scale of entry thus required adds appreciably 
to the total capacity being offered. If the incumbent chooses to fight, the result is lower load factors and, likely, 
financial deficits for incumbents and entrants. Entry into the New Zealand market has been far from easy. 
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Table 1: Weekly numbers of jet services', by sector, Air New Zealand and Ansell New Zealand 
Sector April 1988 May 1990 Nov. 1990 
Air NZ Ansett Air NZ Ansell Air NZ Ansell 
AKL-CHC 121 48 137 87 126 88 
AKL-WLG 182 104 172 133 153 153 
CHC-WLG 134 75 146 101 139 95 
WLG-DUD 22 - 26 - 27 20 
CHC-DUD 44 - 72 39 66 30 
CHC-IVC 26 - 26 - 26 1 
DUD-IVC 14 - 14 - 14 13 
Others 64 14 97 42 176 63 
---------
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ -----
All Get) 607 241 690 402 727 463 
sector 
Note: 
(1) 
Sources: 
Total number of jet services operated in both directions, and flown directly between the city pair. 
Data calculated from airline timetables: for Air New Zealand, domestic timetables effective 28 March 
1988, 23 April 1990, and 5November1990; for Ansell New Zealand, timetables effective 6 March 1988, 
18 March 1990 (Ansell [Australia] System Timetable), and 30September1990. 
Table 2: Capacity (In million of seat·km per week) provided on jel services of Air New Zealand and Ansell New 
Zealand 
Sector April 1988 May 1990 Nov. 1990 
Air NZ Ansel! Air NZ Ansett Air NZ Ansell 
AKL-CHC 10.35 3.04 12.44 5.29 10.87 5.35 
AKL-WLG 10.29 4.45 10.87 5.21 8.87 6.00 
CHC-WLG 4.61 1.95 5.10 2.52 4.80 2.36 
WLG-DUD 1.56 - 1.83 - 1.91 0.53 
CHC-DUD 1.58 - 2.64 1.04 2.42 0.80 
CHC-IVC 1.36 - 1.35 - 1.34 0.04 
DUD-IVC 0.22 - 0.24 - 0.24 0.17 
Others 2.16 0.80 3.69 1.56 6.92 2.52 
All Get) 32.13 10.24 38.16 13.62 37.37 17.77 
services 
Note: 
(1) Total capacity operated in both directions between the city pair. 
Sources: Calculated from flight frequency data (Table 1), and data on aircraft seat capacities. 
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Table 3: Capacity shares on sectors where Air New Zealand and Ansett New Zealand both operate jets at end 
1990; and shares in total jet capacity 
Sector April 1988 May 1990 Nov. 1990 
Air NZ Ansett Air NZ Ansell Air NZ Ansett 
% % % % % % 
AKL-CHC 77 23 70 30 67 33 
AKL-WLG 70 30 68 32 60 40 
CHC-WLG 70 30 67 33 67 33 
WLG-DUD 100 - 100 - 78 22 
CHC-DUD 100 - 72 28 75 25 
CHC-IVC 100 - 100 - 97 3 
DUD-IVC 100 - 100 - 59 41 
All jet 76 24 74 26 68 32 
services 
Capacity is measured by seat-km performed in both directions between city-pairs. 
Source: Calculated from seat-km data in Table 2. 
Table 4: Index numbers for core economy air fares and all air fares, 1984-1990 
Quarter1 Consumers Price Economy Y fare Index of all 
Index (CPI) - ---------------------- airfares (real)' 
all groups nominal2 reaP 
March 1984 883 938 
March1985 1000 1000 1000 1000 
March 1986 1130 1152 1019 945 
Dec.1986 1306 1195 915 885 
June 1987 1381 1381 1000 889 
Sept. 1987 1403 1381 984 855 
Dec.1988 1499 1534 1023 718 
Sept. 1989 1588 1653 1041 706 
June 1990 1651 1788 1083 725 
Dec. 1990 1685 1966 1167 826 
March 1991 1695 775 
Sept. 1991 
Dec.1991 
Notes: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
1703 838 
1702 803 
From 1986 to 1990, the selected quarters match the timing of the successive new fare schedules adopted 
by Air New Zealand and Ansell New Zealand. 
Within each new fare schedule up to end 1990, the economy core fare is increased by almost exactly 
the same percentage for each route. By April 1992, there had been some change in the core fare 
relatives (between different routes). In particular, while nominal AKL-WLG and CHC-WLG fares 
were unchanged from Dec. 1990, the AKL-CHC fare was 5% higher than before. 
Nominal fare level divided by the all-groups CPI (Consumers Price Index). 
Index for all fares of all domestic operators, deflated by all-groups CPI. 
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Sources: 
- CPI all groups: Consumers Price Index: December 1990 Quarter Dept. of Statistics New Zealand 
(Catalogue No. 18.501) 
- Index of all air fares: personal communication, Ministry of Transport - this index is prepared by the 
Department of Statistics, as a component of the CPI. 
- Economy core fares: Air New Zealand timetables and other documents; Ansett fares are the same. 
Table S: Domestic aviation: services of all operators, and of Air New Zealand, 1985-1989 
Calendar No. of Passenger km Seat km 
year passengers travelled available 
(millions) (millions) (millions) 
Services of all operators 
1985 3.25 1554 2271 
1986 3.44 1652 2414 
1987 3.78 1728 2540 
1988 4.17 1900 3166 
1989 4.47 1908 3088 
1990 4.50 2102 3599 
Services of Air New Zealand (with percentage shares of industry totals) 
Passenger 
load factor 
(%) 
68.4 
68.5 
68.0 
60.0 
61.8 
58.4 
1985 2.77 (85) 1382 (89) 1992 (88) 69.4 
1986 3.00 (87) 1494 (90) 2132 (88) 70.1 
1987 2.96 (78) 1506 (87) 2189 (86) 68.8 
1988 2.92 (70) 1502 (79) 2256 (71) 66.5 
1989 2.86 (64) 1481 (78) 2310 (75) 64.1 
Sources: Data on all operators: personal communication, Ministry of Transport, Wellington, Dec. 1990 and 
August 1991 (see also New Zealand Official Yearbook Dept. of Statistics, Wellington) 
Data on Air New Zealand: Air New Zealand Annual Report 1990 p. 22. These data exclude the 
outputs of subsidiaries and associates, and are for financial years to 31 March, here assigned to nearest 
calendar years. The italicised numbers in brackets measure Air New Zealand output as a percentage 
of the corresponding industry total. 
Table 6: Some financial data for Ansell New Zealand 
Year ended 30 June: 1989 1990 1991 
NZ$ million 
Gross revenue from airline operations 92.6 137.0 152.8 
Operating loss before taxation and abnormals 52.5 43.8 19.3 
Retained deficit carried forward2 68.7 98.0 147.1 
Source: Consolidated Financial Statements for Ansell New Zealand Limited (formely Ansell Airlines of 
Australia Limited) 
Notes: (1) The data are consolidated figures for the New Zealand group. 
(2) The deficit carried forward from 1988 (the first year of operation) was NZ$ 31.8 million. 
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